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Reform of the Structure of the
American Corporation:
The "Two-Tier" Board Model
By
THoMAs J. SCHoENBAum*
and
JOACHIM LIESER*
I. IN=ODUCMION
It is undeniable that the corporation as a legal, economic
and social institution has been a great success. Its ability to
organize large numbers of people and great amounts of capital
into an instrument for action is proverbial. It has become mainly
responsible for technological innovation in the western world.
It plays a social and philanthropic role, replacing the historical
function of the churches in this regard. It is a chief patron of
art and architecture, thereby carrying out a function once ful-
filled by princes and nobility. The modem state turns to it for
everything from military defense to anti-poverty programs.
Paradoxically, however, there exists a certain uneasinms
about the corporation as an institution. This is felt not only in
the United States, but in substantially all western industrialized
countries. It stems primarily from the realization that corporations
hold great power and influence and the feeling that sufficient
controls on the exercise of such power are lacking. The many
facets of this phenomenon have been well documented. Manage-
ment's freedom from control by the shareholders in certain larger
corporations is well known.' Corporate power leads to some
measure of control over markets and the prices of goods and
* Associate Professor of Law, Univ. of North Carolina; Visiting Lecturer,
Universitift zu K6ln, Germany, 1972-73.** Habilitationsstipendiat der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft, Institut far
Bankrecht (School of Finance and Banking Law), Universitt zu K6ln, Germany.
I See generally A. BmER_ & A. MEANS, Tna MODERN CORPORATION AND Plu-
VATE PROPERTY (1968); Bostow, To Whom and For What Ends is Corporate
Management Responsible, in E. MASON, THE CORPORATION IN MoDmN Socmrv 46,
53 (1960) [hereinafter cited as MASo N].
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services.2 It is Professor Galbraith's thesis that many varieties
of products are not provided as a result of consumer demand, as
classical economics would have it, but are determined in advance
by the marketing and advertising power of the corporation.3
Environmentalists charge that many corporations through lobby-
ing activities thwart the passage of effective laws for the control
of pollution and that they do not attempt to comply with environ-
mental legislation and regulations.4 The great corporations have
been described as "political systems" with market, social and
political influence going beyond their function as legal and
economic entities, and yet they are not sufficiently subject to the
checks and balances on overbearing power that characterize a
democratic system.5
The wide spectrum of solutions advanced to combat these
problems have for the most part been concerned with developing
countervailing forces that will provide a check on abuse of
corporate power but will not unnecessarily inhibit the power of
action of management.6 There has been a trend toward greater
governmental regulation of economic matters and increased re-
quirements of disclosure by corporations.7  Many have looked
to the shareholder group, the owners of the enterprise, as the best
agency for controlling managerial power. This approach has
centered on improving the system of voting by proxy and infusing
the shareholders' meeting with greater powers.8 Still others have
contended that the constituency of the corporation includes not
only the shareholder-owners but also workers, suppliers, cus-
tomers and the general public, and that these groups should be
2 See Brewster, The Corporation and Economic Federalism, in MASON, supra
note 1, at 72.
3J. GALBRArrH, TnE NEW INDusTRIAL STATE 209-12 (2d ed. 1971).
4J. EsTosrro, VANISHIG Am 280-87 (1970).
5 Latham, The Body Politic of the Corporation, in MASON, supra note 1, at
218, 228.
6 See generally Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management
in Modem Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CA=n. L. Rnv. 1 (1969).
7A governmental program for the regulation of wages and prices has, of
course, been instituted in the United States. Moreover, the Securities Exchange
Commission has repeatedly taken the initiative to strengthen corporate reporting
of financial and business information. See generally Schoenbaum, The Relationship
Between Corporate Disclosure and Corporate Responsibility, 40 FORD. L. BEV.
565 (1972).
8 Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends is Corporate Management Responsible,
in MASON, supra note 1, at 53 Schwartz, The Public Interest Proxy Contest: Re-
flections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REv. 421 (1971).
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represented in some way in corporate managementY Another
group of writers sees management power as inevitable and wel-
comes the strong manager who is in a position to balance the
conflicting claims of all the "constituencies" of the corporation
and, using principles of management ethics, to make decisions
in the public interest.10 All of these solutions have been imple-
mented to some extent. The past decade has witnessed the
passage of new governmental regulatory measures and new
forms of corporate disclosure, reform and greater use of the
mechanism for proxy voting, the installation of "public-interest
directors" in some corporations and a greater consciousness on
the part of management of its ethical obligations toward society.
But despite the partial success of these developments, there is a
widely held view that larger reforms are needed.
The debate on corporate responsibility has recently shifted
to new ground. Increasingly, scholars are examining and ques-
tioning the legal "constitutional" structure of the corporation, the
essence and interrelationship of the legal forms required for
carrying out the process of corporate decisionmaking. Is the
American legal model of entrusting the management of the
corporation to a theoretically unitary board of directors elected
by the shareholders inherently defective? Should it be discarded
in favor of another more workable system?
The principal alternative legal model for corporate decision-
making in use in the western industrialized world is the "two-
tier" board system, originally developed in Germany. It is based
on inserting a supervisory board between the shareholder and
management power centers, whose main function is to watch
over the activities of the managing board. The German system
was explored in 1966 by Professor Vagts who took a largely
negative view regarding its possible use in the United States."
9 Chayes, The Modem Corporation and the Rule of Law, in MASON, supra
note 1, at 25, 43.
'0 See Blough, Functions of Directors under the Existing System, 27 Bus.
LAw. 37 (Special Issue 1972).
11Vagts, Reforming the Modern Corporation: Perspectives from the German,
80 HARv. L. REv. 23 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Vagts]. Professor Vagts has
pointed out that there are many advantages in the two-tier system, however. See
Vagts, "he European System, 27 Bus. LAw. 165 (Special Issue 1972). Fcr a
recent negative view by a German scholar see Roth, Supervision of Corporate
Management: The "Outside" Director and the German Experience, 51 N.C.L. REv.
1369 (1973).
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Others have taken a more favorable view of the two-tier
system. Dean Manning, in 1958, called for a new corporate
model which would recognize management supremacy but would
include a separate supervisory board to watch over and act as a
check and balance on management.-2 Professor Conard has
recently proposed that the outside directors in American public
corporations be given control of the shareholder proxy solicitation
machinery or, alternatively, that a council of auditors be created
to supervise management. 3 Both of these suggestions would
tend to create a two-tier system. Furthermore, the two-tier idea
has shown remarkable strength in Europe outside Germany. In
1966, the French Law on Commercial Companies was modernized,
and the two-tier board consisting of an executive board (direc-
toire) and a supervisory council (conseil de surveillance) was
provided as an optional alternative to the existing single tier
French system.'4 A commission appointed to modernize the
Belgian company law has proposed that the two-tier administra-
tion be adopted as the exclusive organizational structure for a
stock company.15 In the Netherlands a 1971 law requires that
large companies, most of which already had a council of
auditors, have a supervisory council in the image of the Ger-
man system.16 The two-tier board system has received increas-
ing favor on the supra-national level of the European Com-
munity (E.C.). The Commission of the E.C. has approved a
draft of a European law for stock companies which is intended
for the use of multi-national companies operating in more than
one country. The two-tier system would be mandatory for
companies organized and operating under this law. In October,
1972, the Commission agreed upon a proposed fifth directive on
'2 Manning, Review of Joseph Livingston, The American Shareholder, 67 Yr.5
L.J. 1477 (1958). For a valuable study of this idea from the German point of
view see G. RoTH, DAs TREuHANDMODELL DES INvEsThIEN'rnvrrs-EINE AL-
TERNATIVE ZUR AKTrENGESELLSCHAFT (1972).
'3 Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of. Directors" Liability, 1972 DUrKE L.J. 895,
917-18. Professor Conard develops this further in Conard, An Overview of the Law
of Corporations, 71 MicH. L. REv. 623, 687-88 (1978).
14 Law No. 66-587 of July 24, 1966, J.O. (July 26, 1966) Arts. 118-50. There
are, however, significant differences between the French and German two-tier
systems. For an analysis see E. STEN, HARmoNATioN or EURoPE.AN CoMPA-Y
LAws 837 (1971) [hereinafter cited as STEiN].
15 For details see STEIN, supra note 14, at 126-86.
16WETBoEK VAN KooPsmrmnD (Netherlands Corporation Code) § 50. For
the background of this legislation see STFN, supra note 14, at 150-51.
17 Doc. Com. (70) 600 final, Partie I-III Arts. 62-82.
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the harmonization of the company law of the member states of
the E.C. and submitted it to the Community Council for approval.
This proposed directive involves the structure of stock companies
organized according to national law and would require that all
member states enact amendments to their respective laws insti-
tuting the two-tier system for all stock companies. 8
In view of the continuing vitality of the two-tier idea, its
serious study is merited in the United States. It may well be that
future reform of American corporation laws will be along the lines
of developing a two-tier form for publicly-held corporations over
a certain size, analogous to the movement in many states toward
enacting a separate regime for decisionmaking in close corpora-
tions.' The legally required corporate model, originally the same
for the family business and the largest public enterprise, may in
the future become three distinctive models, one for the close
corporation, another (the unitary board system) for intermediate
corporations, and still another for the large publicly-held enter-
prise.
II. ThE PROCESS OF ConponaxE DECIsIONM AiXNG uNEma THE
Two-Tim MODEL iN GERmANY
The two-tier model existing under German law posits three
centers of power and decisionmaking, the managing board (Vor-
stand), the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) and the share-
holders' assembly (Hauptversammlung). All three centers have
clearly defined legal duties, rights and responsibilities which are
interrelated. The following analysis will concentrate not only
on the statutory scheme, but also on available empirical data as
to their actual role in practice.
A. The Managing Board
The central role in corporate decisionmaking under the Ger-
man system is accorded to the managing board. It consists of
full-time managers who by statute are granted independent
power to initiate and carry out decisions. In matters over which
1s Vorschlag einer fiinften Bichtlinie ilber die Struktur der Aktiengesellsebaft,
Bull. der Europiischen Gemeinschaften, Beilage 10/72, Kapitel I-I.
19 For a summary of special corporate law provisions relating to the close
corporation see W. PNTrEm, ComoRE AND TAx AsPEcTs oF CLOSELY HELD
CORPORAMTONS (1971).
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they are given control, they may act independently and even
against the wishes of the shareholder assembly and the super-
visory board since they derive their power from statute and not
from the shareholder assembly or the supervisory board. In
order to safeguard their independence, the managers may be
elected for up to 5 year terms and may only be removed for
cause (wichtiger Grund) .
2 1
1. Method of Election
Managers are elected by majority vote of the members of the
supervisory board. 22 There is no requirement that they be share-
holders or fulfill other formal prerequisites. The only important
limitation the supervisory board must fulfill in choosing managers
is in the mining and steel industries, where in order to assure
worker codetermination of management policies, the managing
board must contain a labor manager with the special task of
handling personnel and labor matters.3 Empirical studies of
the approximately 100 companies required to employ labor
managers have cast doubt on the workability of this institution.
Systematic interviews of managing board and supervisory board
members showed that severe problems of conflicts of loyalties
and strife between the labor manager and the other board
members are avoided only because the special labor manager
requirement is largely circumvented. As a practical matter no
labor manager is elected who is not acceptable to the managing
board; if the attempt is made, the position is merely left open
for a long period. Once elected, he functions merely as any other
member of the board. All the persons interviewed, including the
20 Aktiengesetz of Sept. 6, 1965 76, BGBl. I, 1069 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as AktG.]. The Aktiengesetz has been published in a bilingual edition. See
AxTiENESETZ 1965: TBr GmRmAN STOCK ConroRAaxoN LAw (R. Mueller and E.
Galbraith transl. 1966); C. BAz, U. KLuG, J. MAYEm-LANDRuT, H. WInEMANN,
K. MELLEROWICz, W. ScHILLING & H. WuRDiNGER, 2 AK-rENGEEs=Z, GRossKON:-
MENTAR 580-81 (1973) [hereinafter cited as GRossxommENTAR].
21 AktG. § 84.
22 Id.
2 3 Law on Codetermination (Mitbestimmung) of Employees in the Supervisory
Council and Managing Board of Enterprises in the Mining, Iron and SteelProduc-
ing Industries of May 21, 1951 § 13, BGB1. I, 347 (1951), as last amended Sept.
6, 1965, BGBI. I, 1185 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Mitbest G.]. The labor director
is also required for holding companies in the same industries. Law to Supplement
the Law on Codetermination of Employees in the Supervisory Council and Man-
aging Board of Enterprises in the Mining, Iron and Steel Producing Industries of
August 7, 1956 § 13, BGBI. I, 707 (1956) as last amended April 27, 1967, BGB1. I,
505 (1967) [hereinafter cited as MitbestErgG.].
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labor directors themselves, believed strongly that a homogeneous
managing board, without special interest groups, was absolutely
necessary for the success of the decisionmaking process. 4
2. Duties and Responsibilities
The statutory duties and responsibilities of the managing
board are quite broad. They include representing the corporation
and making decisions vis-a-vis third parties (Vertretung) and
making and carrying out internal decisions relating to the man-
agement and economic performance of the business (Geschdfts-
fihrung) .25 The latter responsibility includes those matters which
are in the domain of the inside director-officers in the American
public corporation, such as deciding what investments are to be
made, what goods and services are to be bought and sold, what
prices are to be paid and charged, where production is to take
place, where financing is to be obtained and what employees are
to be taken on and how much they are to be paid.28 The managers
are also responsible for fulfilling financial reporting and other
public and social tasks required by law27 and are given the power
of initiative in basic corporate changes such as corporate divisions
and mergers.2 8 Such basic changes, however, are subject to the
approval of the shareholder assembly.
29
Although some specialization of function occurs in practice,
the entire managing board is subject to liability for negligence
or breach of loyalty regarding these functions.30 This liability
cannot be avoided by getting the approval of the supervisory
board. 1 The managers must run the business in the interest of
the enterprise as a whole as well as for the benefit of the share-
holders who have provided the capital.3 2 They are also responsi-
24This empirical data was compiled by a special commission appointed in
1968, by Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger to m e a comprehensive study of code-
termination (Mitbestimmung), in the context of the two-tier board model. The
chairman was Kurt Biedenkopf, then Professor at the University of Bochum. See
MrBESTIMMUNG IM UNRNIImEN-BEIucHT DER SACHVERSTANDIGENKOMMISSION
87-89 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Biedenkopf Report]. See also K. BImEENKOPF,
MrrBESMn rNG, BErrA E zuR oRDNuNrsPoLriscHEN DsKussloN 83 (1972).
25 AktG. §§ 77-78.
2 6 Grosskonmentar 582-83.
27 Id. at 582.
28 AktG. § 83; Grosskommentar 582.
29 AktG. §§ 319, 340, 359, 362.
oId. § 93.
311d. §§ 93(4), 111.
32 Grosskommentar 586-87.
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ble, however, for the welfare of the workers and must respect the
public interest.38 The latter responsibility, which most com-
mentators admit is impossible to define precisely, means that the
corporation must respect relevant public laws and policies, such
as social policies, economic, antitrust and fair competition legisla-
tion, tax laws and environmental regulations . 4 It must be pointed
out, however, that concrete instances of liability of managing
board members are relatively rare 5 Whether this is due pri-
marily to the failure and inability of practical application of
German liability concepts or to the success of the two-tier system
as an early warning system cannot be stated with certainty. There
is an empirical basis, however, for the latter view.36
B. The Supervisory Council
All German stock companies (Aktiengesellschaften), except
certain family companies, as well as limited liability companies
(Gesellschaften mit beschrinkter Haftung)37  with over 500
employees are required to have a supervisory board. It must
include at least three and no more than 21 persons and the num-
ber must be divisible by three8 except in companies in the
83 Id. at 587; see Mertens, Politisches Programm in der Satzung der Aktien-
gesellschaft?, 23 N=tm JumUsscE WocHENscMaiFr 1718 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Mertens].
34 Mertens, supra note 33, at 1719; Grosskommentar at 586. Until the revision
of 1965, the German Stock Company Law contained an express provision requiring
corporations to act in the public interest. This was dropped as unnecessary since
acting in response to the public interest is implied in existing law. Grosskom-
mentar at 586. For a critical view of the provision see Vagts, supra note 11 at 40-
43; see also Duden, Uber Unternehmensziele, in REcirr usrNDlREcHTSrmxB N n DEa
SOZIALEN DEMOKBATIE, FESTGABE FUR Orro KuNZE zuims 65. GEBVRTsTAG 127
(1969), who argues that specific and different purposes should be developed for
every large corporation.
35 It is common for the managers to regularly ask for and get a shareholders
resolution largely absolving them from liability for business decisionmaking. The
shareholders' derivative suit is weaker than its counterpart in American law. Gross-
kommentar at 740-41. See also Rittner, Zur Verantwortung des Vorstandes nach f
76 Abs. I AktG. 1965, in Festschrift fur Ernst Gessler zum, 65 GEBURTSTAG 139
(1970); Frels, Die Geschdftsverteilung im Vorstand einer Aktiengesellschaft, 8
ZErrscm-RT FUR DAS GESAmTE HANDELSRECHT uND KoNKuRsREcIrr 122 (1966).36 See text accompanying notes 102-03 infra.
37The limited liability company or GMBH is a special German corporate form
for companies whose shares are not traded on the stock exchanges. It does not
correspond exactly to the American close corporation since manylarge enterprises
operate in this form. The supervisory board requirement was designed to prevent
evasion of the supervision requirement through the choice of the GMBH form.
The supervisory board requirement must also be observed by Limited Partnerships
with Shares (Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien), Reciprocal Insurance Co-
operatives (Versicherungsvereine auf Gegenseitigkeit), Cooperatives (Genossen-
schaften) and some special mining associations (Bergrechtliche Gewerkschaften).
38AktG. § 95.
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mining, coal and steel industries where different rules apply.3 9
Any natural person may serve on the board, but no member can
take an active part in the management of the business or serve
on the supervisory council of more than 10 companies.40 The term
of office is a maximum of four years, but reelection is permitted.41
1. Method of Election
One of the most distinctive features of the German supervisory
board is the method of its election. Although the board is elected
by the shareholders, 42 only two-thirds of the members may be
freely chosen by the shareholders.43 Agreements for the pooling
of votes are enforceable,44 and it is common for this portion of
the board to be nominees of banks, other companies and dominant
shareholders.45 No conditions or instructions can be attached
to the election of board members, however.4 As to the other one-
third of the board members, the shareholders must elect persons
named in an election by the labor force of the company.47 At
least two of the worker representatives must be employees of the
enterprise; 48 the others are frequently national union officials.
The makeup of the supervisory board of mining, coal and steel
companies is subject to different requirements. These corporations
must possess a supervisory council with an equal number of
worker and shareholder representatives.49 To break possible tie
votes, the board in these industries must have an odd or neutral
member who is elected by a process of "cooptation" by the agree-
ment of the shareholder- and worker-elected factions of the
board. 50 The neutral man functions primarily as an arbitrator
between the two sides;51 he is not a specific representative of
the public interest as one writer seems to have supposed.52
39 See text accompanying notes 49-53 infra.
4 0 AktG. § 100( i)and (2).
411d. § 102(1).
421d. § 10(1).
43 Grosskommentar at 800-07.
44 Id. at 799-800.
45 Id. at 768.
40 Id. at 860-61.4 7 Law on the Constitution of Enterprise (Betriebsverfassungsgestetz) of
October 11, 1952, § 76, BGB1. I, 681, as last amended January 15, 1972, BGB1, I,
13 (1972) [hereafter cited as BetriebsVG.].48 BetriebsVG. § 76(2).
49 MitbestG. § 4.
5o Id. §§ 4, 8.
51 Biedenkopf Report 69.52 Vagts, supra note 11, at 67.
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The labor members of the supervisory board in coal, steel and
mining companies are chosen by an elective committee formed
by the plant councils of the company.5
3
The justification for this unique election procedure is found
in the German theory of "codetermination" (Mitbestimmung) 4
of workers, of which labor representation on the supervisory
board is just one aspect. Codetermination, which will be more
fully treated later in this article, 55 is based upon the theory
that workers in an enterprise should be provided the opportunity
to "co-decide" questions which affect them individually and the
work-force of the enterprise as a whole. 6 Although labor repre-
sentatives do not directly participate in the management of the
enterprise (Geschiftsfiihrung),57 they have as much right as the
shareholders to take part in the supervision of the company
through representation on the supervisory board. 58 The separation
between the supervisory board and the management allows the
representation of particular interests, the large shareholders,
banks and the workers, without destroying the relative homo-
geneity of the management. It should be pointed out, however,
that, despite their ties to particular interest groups, the members
of the supervisory board are required to give priority to the
interest of the enterprise as a whole. Breach of this duty of
loyalty as well as breach of the duty of care gives rise to
liability.59 Severe problems of loyalty can occur when there is a
strike. German case law permits worker representatives to take
part passively in a legal strike, but imposes liability for active
participation and even passively accepting an illegal strike.60
53 MitbestG. § 6.
54 It is unfortunate that the concrete and dynamic German word "Mitbestim-
mung" is translated into English by use of the abstract and static word "code-
termination". Mitbestimmung in German carries the connotation of active partici-
pation in the process of decisionmaking; this is absent from the English term.
55 See text accompanying notes 114-42 infra.
56 K. BIEDENKOPF, MrrBESTMMIUNG, BETRAGE ZUR ORwNUNGSPOLmiSCEmN Drs-
KUSsION 90 (1972). For a more complete discussion of the theoretical basis of
codetermination see Koch, Die Mitbestimmung der Arbeiter in Deutschland:
Entstehung, Bewdhrung und weitere Entwicklung, in MITBESTMMUNG IN DER
UNMPunMsUNc (C. Lattman and V. Ganz-Keppeler eds. 1972).
57Except in the coal, steel and mining industries, where a 'labor manager is
mandatory and very controversial. See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.5s See Schilling, Maoht und Verantwortung in der Aktiengesellschaft (oder
das Prinzip der Interesseneinheit), in FESTscamUnr Fra Eusr GEssLJM zU 65
GEBURTSTAG 159, 164 (1970).
59 AktG. 
6 11 .
60 For a summary of the German case law see Grosskommentar at 768-69;
(Continued on next pages
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However, Professor Vagt's view"' that board members would be
impaled on conflicts of interest is allayed by empirical studies of
the problem carried out by the Biedenkopf Commission deter-
mining that in practice such conflicts are surprisingly rare; man-
aging board members have confidence in the loyalty of the labor
supervisory board members.
02
2. Duties and Responsibilities
The supervisory council has two principal tasks. First, the
council elects the members of the managing board and may
remove them for cause. Second, the council is responsible for
the continual supervision of the management of the enterprise. 4
In its supervisory capacity, the board is charged with overseeing
and advising on the policies of the company, its profitability, its
economical operation, its treatment of social and labor questions
and its compliance with public laws, regulations and social poli-
cies, although the supervision and advice may not extend to
disturbing the initiative of the managing board or taking over
the operation of the business. 5
In addition to these two major tasks, the council has other
important duties. It fixes the wages, pensions and deferred
income of the members of the managing board.6 Each member's
total compensation must be in proportion to his activities and
position in the company. 7 The company may extend credit to a
member of management only with the approval of the supervisory
board.' These rules go far to eliminate the inherent conflict of
interest regarding compensation in American law, where inside
directors sit on the board which fixes their salary and fringe
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Fischer, Minderheiten-Vertreter im Aufsichtsrat, 11 NUE JuusTisCHE Wocrmx-
scHiFT 1265 (1958).
61 See Vagts, supra note 11 at 74-75.
62 Biedenkopf Report at 72-84.
63 AktG. § 84.
04 Id. § 111(1). This separation of supervision from active management is the
most distinctive feature of the two-tier system. In Germany the unitary board
system has been rejected because under the latter this separation of functions
would no longer exist. See K. BiEDENxOPF, C. CLAUSSEN, G. GEILEN, H. KoP-
PEisTmm, A. KnAr-, H. KRONSTEmN, M. LurrER, H. MERTENs AND W. ZoLLNEU,
5 KOLNER KOMmENTAR zurm AXTIrNGESE'rZ 805 (1973).
05 AktG. § 111(4).
00 Id. § 87.
07id. § 87(1). Supervisory board members can be personally liable for
breach of this rule. Grosskommentar at 676.
68 AltG. § 89.
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benefits. 9 The council also checks the annual report of the inde-
pendent auditors and makes a yearly report to the shareholders
on the state of the enterprise. 70 By majority vote it can call a
special meeting of the shareholders.
7 1
The corporate charter can also provide that certain manage-
ment decisions such as major investments, financing, acquisitions
and changes in the business require the approval of the super-
visory council. If the council withholds its consent, and the
managers wish to go through with the measure, they can do so
only by obtaining the approval of three-fourths of the share-
holders.72 Such a provision is common in German corporate
charters. This provides a check on management power and con-
sideration of important decisions by a separate body that can
avoid unwise decisions.
3. Practical Effectiveness
The effectiveness of the supervisory board is a subject of
great controversy in Germany. It is charged that such a body is
unnecessary since it is dominated by banks, which are often the
dominate voting blocks in Germany,73 and by the large share-
holders aligned with management. 74 This contention has been at
least partially rebutted by empirical studies. The Biedenkopf
Commission, which was set up to study codetermination and the
supervisory board,75 examined the membership of the boards of
a representative sample of German industry and found that,
although shareholders dominate the supervisory councils of smaller
companies, the board membership in publicly-held companies is
drawn primarily from universities, politics and administration. 7
The commission also determined that surprisingly few members
come from the banking industry. Approximately half of the sample
69 The compensation of the members of the supervisory board is in turn fixed
by the shareholders. Id. § 113.
70 Id. § 111, 170-73.
7ld. § 111(3).
72AktG. § 111(4); Grosskommentar at 581, 880-85. As a general rule, be-
fore taking any important decision, the managing board will consult with the
supervisory board members. Interview with leading German bandng official in
Frankfurt, West Germany, June 8, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Interview].
73 See text accompanying notes 108-09 infra.
74 See GUTENBERG, FUNTIONSWANDEL DES AuFSIC=rnATEs, ERGANZUNGSHEFT,
ZErrscmIFr Fu BETBIEswIBTscHAr 1-10 (Dec. 1970).
75 See note 24 supra.7 6 Biedenkopf Report at 57.
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had no bank representative.77 The commission concluded that
the advisory and supervisory functions of the supervisory board
were especially important in large publicly-held companies.78
A more serious criticism of the supervisory council is that it
tends to be a weak body dominated by the management of the
company. It tends to be a part-time body whose busy members
meet only a few times a year. There is serious question whether
such a group can exercise independent judgment on the policies
of the corporation.70
The empirical evidence compiled by the Biedenkopf Com-
mission lends some support to this view. Its study of supervisory
board decisionmaking showed that in practice differences of view
between the managers and the supervisory council as well as
within the council itself are rare.80 Much of the time, decisions
of supervisory councils are taken without dissent.8'
The commission, however, extensively interviewed supervisory
council members and others to determine why this situation
exists. It found that differences of opinion between council
members and between the council and the managers are usually
resolved prior to the formal decisionmaking in informal discus-
sions and negotiations. Information is transmitted to the council
and they are asked their opinion. The council members are
given at least an opportunity to shape the decisions of the man-
agers. The Biedenkopf Commission judged these informal nego-
tiating sessions to be beneficial both to the managers and the
council.82 Others, however, have taken a more negative view,
maintaining that the negotiations give the managers the oppor-
tunity to dominate the council, endangering its independence.8 3
Perhaps this difficulty can be best resolved by strengthening
the powers of the supervisory board. A more detailed enumeration
77Id. at 57, 220.
78 Id. at 56.
79 The foremost proponent of this argument has been B. WIETHOLTmn, IN-
'rERESSEN UND ORGANISATION DER AG 3M AIMERPANISCUEN UND) DEUTSCHEN RECHT
295-314 (1961). Professor Wieth'lter believes that as a result the unitary board
system should he adopted in German law. See also E.J. MESTMACKER, VERWAL-
TUNG, KONZERNGEWAIT ] RECATE DER AETIONAJSE 83-88 (1958); Vagts, supra
note 11 at 52-53.80 Biedenkopf Report at 62, 221.
81 Id. at 221.
82 Id. at 62-64.83 Pruhs, Vorbesprechungen und Fralctionsbildung im Aufsichtsrat, 15 DiE
ATrrMNGESELLSCHA T 193, 194-95 (1970).
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of its statutory powers and responsibilities may be needed.,
Moreover, the council could be transformed by requiring a
certain number of its members to be full-time professionals with
their own staff and with continual access to information inde-
pendent of that provided by the managing board.s This would
go far to guarantee and protect the council's independence.
Still another problem exists with respect to the process of
decisionmaking within the supervisory council. At present there
are few legally required formalities. Decisions are taken by
majority vote, and the chairman must prepare and sign a state-
ment of the decision taken.86 In practice, however, most matters
are delegated to committees.8 7 Although this delegation of power
cannot be used to discriminate against any group of members
8
and some decisions, such as the election of the managing board,
cannot be delegated,8 9 there should be a requirement of common
participation in all decisions.
4. Sources of Information
If the supervisory board is to function properly, it must be
adequately informed about the enterprise. German law requires
the managing board to provide information to the supervisors.
At least once a year, the supervisors must be given an account
of the business operations of the past year. This includes financial
statements and a report on the success of the business.90 In addi-
tion, at least once every quarter, the supervisors are provided
with an account of the present state of the business including
workers employed, price and wage developments, orders received
and financial liquidity. 1 The managers must also provide an
annual report on their plans for the future encompassing basic
plans and policies, market analyses and trends, advertising,
84 See Hillert, Gedanken zur Erweiterung der Mitbestimmung der Arbeit-
nehmer, 1970 BLT=Bs-BERATER 1258, 1259.
85 See Mertens, Unternehmensverfassung: Aufsichtsrat oder board system, 25
WmRTSCHAFrswocm 31, 34 (1971). It is presently the practice of some German
companies, especially banks, to employ full-time supervisory board members. In-
terview, supra note 72.
86 AktG. § 107-08.87 Grosskommentar at 849-50.
88 Id. at 850, 861.
89 Id. at 851.
90 AktG. § 90(1).
91 Id.
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investments and financing, and projected sales and profits.12
Members of the council have a right to information on the details
of the business at any time, 3 but this is seldom exercised.
It is evident that, despite the statutory guarantee of adequate
information, all information that the supervisors receive is filtered
through the managing board. This dependence on management
is not conducive to the supervisory council's role of providing
independent advice and supervision. It is thus important to
strengthen this aspect of the council's role by giving the super-
visors original and continuing access to information about the
enterprise. In large companies the supervisors should have inde-
pendent access to information through the use of modern com-
puter technology. Furthermore, to enhance the participation of
the individual worker through their representatives on the super-
visory council, channels for the direct and frequent exchange of
information and ideas between the supervisors and the individual
workers could be set up using modem methods of communication.
It is evident that full implementation of these ideas would be
impossible without also requiring a certain number of supervisors
to be full-time professional employees. 94 A possible solution for
reform of the German law would be to require three professional
full-time supervisors, one named by the workers, one selected by
the white-collar employees and one by the shareholders. The
remaining part-time council members could be elected one-half
by labor and one-half by the shareholders. There should be, in
addition, a requirement that the full-time supervisors have certain
qualifications as experts in a relevant field to assure that they
would be able to do more than merely represent the interests of
the respective groups. 5
5. The Supervisory Council and the Public Interest
In the German two-tier model, although the managers have
a duty to act with regard to the public interest and social poli-
92 Id. For a detailed treatment of required reporting to the supervisors see
Saage, Fiihrung und Verantwortung nach dem neuen Aktiengesetz, 1966 NEuE
BET BsWEmTSCHArT 35, 41-42.
03 AktG. § 90(3).9 See text accompanying note 85 supra.
95 One of the writers, ieser, will publish a more detailed elaboration on these
ideas in the 1973 Zurrscnnm' rim REcisrrsroLmrx.
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cies,96 it is the supervisory board that is designed to play the key
role in seeing that the company fulfills this responsibility.97 Thus
any evaluation of the supervisory board must consider how well
it carries out this function.
There is no lack in the German literature of commentary on
the responsibility of the managers and supervisors to act in the
public interest. 8 It is the herrschende Meinung (dominant
opinion) that the obligation to respect the public interest remains
"immanent" in German corporate law despite the 1965 omission of
the express corporate law provision relating to the public interest
which had existed since 1937.19 German scholarship admits that
the concept "public interest" cannot be precisely defined, but it
is looked upon as the responsibility of the corporation to imple-
ment all relevant public and social laws and public policies. 10
Non-adherence to a public obligation provides sufficient cause
(wichtiger Grund) for the removal of a manager by the super-
visory board, and, if the corporation suffers damage, the managers
are liable.10 1
Beyond the theoretical exposition of responsibility to the pub-
lic, however, it is very difficult to detect concrete cases of
application of these principles in German law. There are no
examples of classic confrontations between valiant public-minded
supervisors fighting for the public interest against obdurate man-
agers.
It may be too rash to conclude that the supervisory model has
entirely failed, however. There is some empirical evidence that
would indicate that the supervisors in the German system suc-
ceed in asserting the public interest, although through ways more
subtle than complete confrontation with management. Two
findings of the Biedenkopf Commission are relevant in this regard.
First, in its study of the membership of supervisory boards, it
found that, at least in publicly-held companies, the dominant
96 See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
97 Mertens, supra note 33, at 1719.
98 For the most recent see Duden, supra note 34; Mertens, supra note 33, at
1719: Saage, supra note 92 at 42-43; Schifling, supra note 58; Winkler, Nichtge-
werbliche, ideale, insbesondere politische Zielsetzung als Inhalt von Gesellschafts-
vertriigen und Satzungen, 23 NEm JuprITscHE WOCHENSCHBITF 2055 (1970);
Grosskommentar at 576-80.
99 Grosskommentar 586.
100 Id.
30 Mertens, supra note 33, at 1719.
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influence was exercised by people drawn from public professions,
universities and administrative backgrounds, persons ideally suited
to exercise an influence in favor of public responsibility.02
Second, in systematic interviews of supervisors and managers, the
commission found that the supervisors tend to "filter" manage-
ment initiatives and to exert influence in favor of social and
public policies, although this is no substitute for adequate control
of the corporation by relevant state agencies and other public
officials.0 3 The influence of the supervisors is most effective
when the interest of the public happens to coincide with the
interest of the company, as it often does, if for no other reason
than that the company may be subject to civil or criminal
liability or adverse publicity for failure to carry out a public duty.
It may be utopian to expect more than these subtle effects from
any internal corporate institution.
0 4
C. The Shareholders Assembly
The shareholders under the German two-tier model are re-
sponsible for electing the members of the supervisory board,
selecting the independent auditor, amending the charter, raising
and lowering the capital of the company, approving basic cor-
porate changes such as mergers and dissolution and deciding
the use of the yearly profits of the business. 0 5 The shareholders
may also, at the request of the managers, pass on the business
policies of the company, but the shareholders' decision is not
binding on the managers and the procedure is used chiefly to
assure that the managers will not be liable to the company for
the decision involved. 06
In actual practice, the shareholders in smaller companies tend
to dominate the supervisory and managing boards and to identify
with management, while in larger public companies the position
of the shareholders is very weak. In the latter, as in their American
counterparts, the shareholders generally do not contest the initia-
tives of the managers in such matters as basic corporate changes
1
02 Biedenkopf Report at 56-57.
103 Id. at 64, 73, 191.
104 K. BIEDENKOPF, MrrBsTaIMuNG, BErRtAGE ZuR OPDNNGSPOLm SCHEmN
DzSK-SSION 30-31 (1972).
105 AktG. §§ 119, 319, 340, 359.
106 Id. § 119(1); Grosskommentar at 582.
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and selection of the independent auditors. °7 The central task
of the shareholders is the election of the supervisory board, but
even here the individual shareholder in a publicly-held company
has very little say. German law allows the voting rights of
individual shareholders to be exercised by banking and credit
institutions, which in the German system exercise underwriting
and broker-dealer functions and act as depositaries of the shares
of clients. 08
Much has been written about the evil influence of the banks
in the two-tier system and the healthy lack of such in the Amer-
ican law.10 9 Certainly to proponents of shareholder democracy,
the German situation is anathema. However, certain factors have
generally been overlooked in evaluating the bankers depositary
vote. First, it may be preferable to give voting power in publicly-
held corporations to credit institutions with power, interest and
a financial stake as underwriters and broker-dealers in the business,
than to allow it to be exercised by management through its
control of the proxy solicitation machinery as in the American
system. If the German system is not perfect, at least the managing
board is not given control of its own election.110 Secondly, al-
though the credit institutions in Germany certainly have a great
influence on the supervisory councils, empirical studies have
shown that, at least in larger corporations, the control by the
banks is less than had been supposed.1 It is further diminished
by the mandatory representation of labor representatives on the
supervisory board." 2  Third, the natural competition between
banking institutions and their desire to satisfy their clients tend
to act as checks on any attempt by the banks to run corporations
exclusively in their own interest. 13
10 7 See Zimmerer, Die Organe der Aktiengesellschaft und die Stellung des
Wirtschaftspriifers, 1966 NEuE BEThmBSWiRTSCHAFr 44.
108 For a complete account see Vagts, supra note 11, at 53-58.
109 Id.; H. BusSE, DEPOTSTIMMnECr DER BANXEN (1962); see also Von
Falkenhausen, Des Bankenstimmrecht im neuen Aktienrecht, 1966 Dm ARrIN=G--
SELLSCHAFr 69.
110 See Mhring, Proxy Stimmrecht und geltendes deutsches Akltienrecht, in
FESTSCHmIFr FOr ERNST GEssLER zun 65 GEBURTSTAG 127, 128, 187 (1971).
"II Biedenkopf Report at 57.
112 See text accompanying notes 47-53 supra.
113 See Mhring, supra note 110, at 137.
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III. WoRKER "Co-DEcisio mAxwd" (MrrBESTIMMUNG) UNDER
THE GERmAN MODEL
Although worker codetermination in Germany is an integral
part of the two-tier model, it is also much more than that and
requires separate treatment. Mandatory worker representation
on the supervisory board, treated above, is only one of many
German corporate and labor law institutions designed to assure
the cooperation of capital and labor and to give the individual
workers a voice in decisionmaking. It exists on several other
levels independent from the supervisory board.
A. The Institutions of Codetermination
At the enterprise level (Unternehmensebene) German law
provides for codetermination through worker representation on
the supervisory board and, in coal, steel and mining companies,
through the labor manager. Almost as important is codetermina-
tion at the plant level (betriebsebene) and at the level of the
individual worker (Ebene des einzelnen Arbeitnehmers). At
the plant level, the chief institution of codetermination is the
plant council (Betriebsrat), which represents and is elected by
the workers of each plant. It must be consulted regarding the
social, personal and economic interests of the workers, including
such matters as lay-offs, firings, vacations, plant relocations and
working hours. 14 A quota system insures the representation of
younger workers and minorities on the plant councils."15 Where
an enterprise has several plants, there is provision for the forma-
tion of a council consisting of representatives from the individual
plant councils (Konzernbetriebsrat). 81 6 In addition, larger enter-
prises must appoint an economic committee (Wirtschaftsaus-
schuss) with members drawn from the plant councils. It has
little decisionmaking power, but it must be consulted regarding
questions of business policy117
114 BetriebsVG. §§ 7, 87. German collective bargaining contracts are normally
less comprehensive than American agreements and leave such matters to the plant
councils. See K. BIEDENKOPF, MrrBEsTIMMUNG, BErrRAGE ZUR oRDNUNGsPoLrrI-
scHEN DisKUssIoN 90-91 (1972).
'.5 BetriebsVG. § 10.
116 Id. 54.
1171d. §§ 106-13.
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A 1972 revision of the law dealing with codetermination
strengthened the workers' individual rights and increased code-
termination at the plant level. The representation of interest
groups and minorities was strengthened, the job security and
personal rights of the workers were guaranteed, provision was
made for more adequate channels through which complaints and
ideas of individual workers could be heard and the voice of the
plant councils was strengthened as to personnel policy and social
matters.11
8
B. Evaluation of Codetermination in Germany
Although the institution of codetermination overlaps partially
with the two-tier system, it is analytically distinct and must be
evaluated separately. A fairly complete evaluation is possible
because of the amount of empirical data that has been gathered
in Germany, but the working of codetermination cannot be
measured with scientific exactitude. The effects are not dramatic
and conspicuous, but are subtle and hidden among other factors.
Neither the extreme fears nor the equally extreme expectations
which were voiced when the initial codetermination laws were
passed have been realized. The institutions have proved to be
compatible with the German constitutional guarantee of private
property as well as the market economy in Germany. Although
it has not produced a "new day" for workers, it has contributed to
their material and social welfare.
One of the foremost advantages of the codetermination insti-
tutions, including worker representation on the supervisory boards,
has been greater cooperation between labor and management.
This has been confirmed through extensive interviews. The
obligation of both sides to work together in common institutions
has produced an increased understanding of the problems and
arguments of each side and has contributed to better informed
individual workers.' 19 An opinion poll conducted in 1966 with a
view toward examining the individual worker's opinion of code-
termination showed that within German industry less than 10%
of the workers feel "badly informed" as to the organization,
118 For a complete summary and analysis of the changes made by the 1972
revision see Hromadka, Betriebsverfassungsgestz 1972, 25 NE=E JurasTscHE
WocENSCiiFr 183 (1972).
119 Biedenkopf Report at 118-19.
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production, social relationships and technology in their plant.'
Through better communication and exchange of information,
codetermination seems to have had an indirect effect on higher
wages and fringe benefits, although it is not possible to posit
a direct cause and effect relationship because wages in Germany
are generally negotiated at the industry level.' 2 ' Codetermination
can result in greater social benefits which are negotiated at the
plant level, however, 2 2 and a significant percentage of German
workers believe higher wages to be a result of codetermination. 23
Regarding worker job security and lay-offs, there is evidence
that codetermination, especially through the presence of worker
representatives on the supervisory board, tends to delay employ-
ment cut-backs until arrangements can be made to ease the
impact of he measures on the workers involved. In this manner,
codetermination acts as a social corrective on management de-
cisionmaking.2 4 A poll of 1000 industrial workers in 1966 showed
that 59% were of the opinion that through codetermination lay-
offs would be avoided and 23% believed that they would be laid
off only after very careful consideration by management. Only
11% responded that they would be completely unprotected while
7% had no opinion on the matter. 25
A further advantage of codetermination in Germany is the
institutional setting and obligation it provides for the otherwise
abstract legal duty of management to be responsible to the
workers of the enterprise. 26 Interviews of managers conducted
by the Biedenkopf Commission showed that through the institu-
tions of codetermination managers considered their obligations
120 Erdmann, Der Mythos von der Mitbestimmung-Eine Emnid Umfrage kidirt
Tatbestande 13/14 Dxn ARBFrOEBEn 381, 381-82 (July 20, 1966).
121 Biedenkopf Report at 161-62; Vagts, supra note 11, at 69-70.
122 Biedenkopf Report at 162.
123 Aopinion poll by the Allensbacher Institute in 1968 showed that 51%
of the workers in the coal and steel industry (with parity representation on the
s ervisrI board) believed codeterination results 
in increased fringe benefits
an 22 believed it results in higher wages. REPRAsENTATrvhEBUN zua
PAIITITATisCHEN MrrBEsTnnMuNG DEs INsTrTuTEs FUR DsEosKopIE ALLENsBAcH
5 (October, 1968).
1
2 4 Biedenkopf Report at 80-82.
1
2 5 Erdmann, supra note 120, at 382. The corresponding figures formng ,
coal and steel industry workers were 42%, 20%, 28% and 10% respectivey Ig:
It is interesting to note that in the latter industries, while there is equal repre-
sentation of workers and shareholders on the supervisory board, the individual
workers do not directly elect these representatives; they are named by the plant
councils. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
'
2 0 See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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to the employees to be an integral part of their job. 27 This has
had a positive effect on workers morale. A recent opinion poll of
workers in the mining, coal and steel industry showed that
codetermination helps them identify with their company and feel
a measure of satisfaction with their work.
12
The institutions of codetermination seem to have a beneficial
social effect without harming the profitability of the enterprise.
The Biedenkopf Commission concluded from interviews and
questionnaires that while the principle of maximization of profits
still reigns as the leading corporate purpose, the profit motive
is tempered by the worker representatives' call for legal and social
responsibility. The Commission also found that codetermination
had not harmed management initiative regarding the financial,
investment, dividend, production or product policies of German
enterprises. The worker representatives tend to let the managing
board have a free hand in these matters while merely supervising
the social effects of board policies. The presence of the worker-
supervisors also facilitates collective bargaining and avoids strikes
because of the freer access of the workers to information about
the enterprise.'29
C. Proposals for Extending Codetermination in Germany
Codetermination of workers, including their representation
on the supervisory boards, is now well-accepted in Germany.
All significant political parties and groups affirm its place in
German society. This acceptance has led to proposals for its
further extension, many of which have been the source of great
controversy. These proposals may generally be divided into two
categories: first, ideas for greater participation by the individual
worker and second, the demand that workers be given greater
representation on the supervisory councils.
Proposals for greater participation by the individual worker
are based on a very real defect in the institution-the personal
involvement of the individual employee is relatively slight. The
system is basically representative. Once every three years, the
127Biedenkopf Report at 120.
128 21% of the workers stated they were very satisfied in their job 51%
were quite satisfied, 12% were not very satisfied and 12% were dissatisfied (4%
had no response). Erdmann, supra note 120, at 382.
'2 9 Biedenkopf Report at 78-84, 188-46. No significant problems of keeping
corporate industrial secrets were found. Id. at 146.
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individual casts his ballot in the election of the plant council, 30
and he participates also in the direct election of members of the
supervisory board in enterprises which have one-third worker
representation. 13' In the coal, steel and mining industries, which
have parity worker representation on the supervisory board, the
individual has no right to vote in this second election since the
worker-supervisors are elected by the plant councils. 3 More-
over, approximately one-third of the labor members of the
supervisory board can be and usually are officials of the national
unions who do not have to be employees of the company.
33
Thus, despite changes in the 1972 law providing better handling
of the complaints and ideas of the individual worker, 34 great
numbers remain basically outside the system. To correct this,
some German writers have called for the formation of smaller
councils closer to the level of the individual worker and his prob-
lems. Through the better use of modem methods of communica-
tion and even computer technology, the individual workers and
such smaller councils, as well as the plant council, could be kept
informed about the policies of the company and given an oppor-
tunity to express opinions and ideas.'35 The influence of the
national unions on the supervisory board should be decreased;
all supervisory board members should be elected directly by the
workers of the company.
Demands that workers be given greater representation on the
supervisory councils are based on the argument that real "co-
decisionmaking" by workers requires that they be given parity
representation with the shareholders. The national labor unions
are in the forefront of this movement. Relying on the empirical
material amassed by the Biedenkopf Commission, they call for
parity worker representation (plus a "neutral" member to arbi-
trate and break possible tie votes) and a labor manager for all
enterprises with over 2000 employees, a balance sheet total
130 BetriebsVG. § 13(1).
131 Id. § 76(2).132 MitbestG. § 6(l).
1
3 3 BetriebsVG. § 76(2); Biedenkopf Report at 57-61.
13 4 See note 118 supra and accompanying text.
' 3 5 See J. LmsEn, DER MENSCH nm MnrIELPUNrT, TsSEN uND DOtJmmNTE
zut MrIBESTDMMUNG 34-41 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as LizsEa]; Lieser,
Individum und Mitbestimmung in geteilten Deutschland, 1971 RECrT DEa ARBErr
74, 74-80; Pleyer, Zur Mitwirkung und Mitbestimmung kleinerer Cruppen im
Betrieb, 1964 RlcmT Dan Aim=E 447.
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(Bilanzsumme) of more than 75 million DM and annual sales of
over 150 million DM.' 3' The Social Democratic Party (SPD)
has supported the unions' call for parity between workers and
shareholders, but their proposal omits the requirement of a labor
member of the managing board. 3r The Free Democratic Party
(FDP), which together with the SPD forms the present ruling
coalition in Germany, agrees in principle with the idea of parity
representation, but would allocate some of the seats on the super-
visory board specifically to white-collar workers.' 38 The Christian
Democratic Party (CDU) has been the leading opponent of
parity representation. 139 The CDU's position is in a state of flux,
however, and it is expected that a new proposal will be approved
at the party convention in October, 1978.140
One of the most complicated proposals for the extension of
codetermination was made by the Biedenkopf Commission. It
calls for greater worker representation but not parity. For every
twelve supervisory board members, four would be elected by
the workers, six by the shareholders and two others would be
chosen by majority vote of the worker and shareholder repre-
sentatives. To compensate for the greater number of shareholder
representatives, the labor minority would be given a few com-
pensating rights. The supervisory board would be forbidden to
form committees without worker representation. The minority
in any vote woud be allowed to explain their position in a report
to the shareholders and could compel the majority to state the
basis for its decisions to the other corporate organs. A special
committee with parity representation of workers and shareholders
would select the members of the managing board.'41
It is somewhat surprising that in Germany the question of
136 Mitbestimmung, Bundesvorstand DGB, January 1971, in LiEsER, supra
note 135, at 143-46. For commentary see Koch, Die Mitbestimmung der Arbeit-
nehmer in Deutschland: Entstehung, Bewdhrung und weitere Entwicklung, in
MrrBESTMMUNG IN DER UNTERNEEmuNO 39, 66-67 (C. Lattmann and V. Granz-
Keppeler eds. 1972).
137 Entwurf eines Gesetzes iiber die Unternehmensverfassung in Grossun-
ternehmen und Konzernen (Antrag der SPD Fraktion), in LmsmR, supra 135, at
118-26.
138 Freiburger Thesen der F.D.P. zur Gesellschaftspolitik, in LIESEn, supra
note 135, at 110-18.
139 See Arbeitnehmermitbestimmungsgesetz: Gesetzentwurf der Fraktion der
CDUICSU, in LiEsER, supra note 135, at 126-40.
140 Katzers Mitbestimmungsmodell hat auf dem Hamburger Parteitag keine
Chance, Die Welt, May 24, 1972, at 6 col. 1.141 For a full explanation of the proposals see Biedenkopf Report at 171-74.
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codetermination has been treated as separate from the reform
of the supervisory board since codetermination should take place
on several different hierarchial levels, from small groups at the
sub-department level up to the worker representation on the
supervisory board. Information and ideas should pass freely not
only from the lowest level to the highest but also from the
highest to the lowest. Each level should have appropriate
decisionmaking powers. It is obvious, then, that reform or the
extension of codeternination should not be considered apart from
reform of the supervisory board. The professionalization of the
supervisory board, as suggested above, 142 would increase the
effectiveness of worker codetermination not only at the super-
visory board level but, because of increased information gathering
and dissemination, at the lower levels as well.
IV. TIBE RELEvANcE OF THE Two-TER MODEL AND
CODETERMINATION FOR AmERICAN LAW
In the United States, an increasing number of scholars are
seriously examining the need for restructuring the American
corporation. The two-tier German model is an alternative struc-
ture which has operated successfully, although not flawlessly, in
another legal system. Would the two-tier system work in the
United States? Is it compatible with our existing law and institu-
tions?
The foregoing analysis of the two-tier model and codetermina-
tion shows that the German system should not and cannot be
inserted into American practice without substantial modification.
This would do violence to the many American corporate, securi-
ties, and labor law concepts and practices that have no counter-
part in German law. Furthermore, the weaknesses of the German
system must be avoided.
In particular, it should be stressed that the two-tier model is
not appropriate for all corporations. It should not affect close
corporation practice, and it is not suited to medium-sized corpo-
rations which are dominated and controlled by a few major
shareholders. The German experience shows that in the latter
companies, the supervisory board tends to be an unnecessary
body, controlled by the dominant shareholders who also manage
1
4 2 See text accompanying notes 85, 94 supra.
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the corporation.143 On the other hand, the supervisory council
has been shown to work best in corporations with large and
widely dispersed shareholder groups.'44 In American law, then,
it would seem that consideration of the two-tier system should
focus on its possible use as a special legal form for large, publicly-
held corporations.
It is also highly questionable whether the entire machinery
for worker codetermination can be carried over into American
law. American labor law has a distinctive character and is much
more comprehensive than its German counterpart. 45 There are
indications that distinctive institutions in the United States ac-
complish at least a substantial part of what codetermination pro-
vides under German law. The scope of collective bargaining is
particularly narrow in Germany, being carried out on the industry
level and seldom involving more than just wages. In contrast the
United States tends to have strong local unions which are well
organized within individual plants. 46 Collective bargaining agree-
ments and the duty in American law to bargain in good faith
regulate most of the areas such as vacations, working conditions,
hours, lay-offs and plant relocations that are taken care of by
codetermination in Germany. 47
There is no American institution, however, which is analogous
to German codetermination at the enterprise level (accomplished
through labor representation on the supervisory board). This
might be introduced in the United States; however, the German
experience, which shows the necessity of a relatively homo-
geneous management group, 48 indicates that worker representa-
tion should not be introduced in the United States without a
143 Biedenkopf Report at 56.
144 Id. at 56-57.
145 See generally Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American
Labor Law, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1394 (1971).
146 Bok, supra note 145, at 1406-11.
147 Id. See also K. BIEDENKOPF, MITBESTIMuNG, BErrAGE zuR ORDfNUNGS-
PoLrriscHEN Dis ussIoN 90-91 (1972). It is true, of course, that in the United
States only about one-fourth of the employees that could avail themselves of union-
ism under Federal law have actually done so. As to non-unionized employees
there is still unilateral employer determination of the terms and conditions of
employment except as regulated by statute. Thus there is room for further study
of codetermination at the plant level under German law and its appropriateness
for American law. Such a study would have to focus on the labor law aspects of
codetermination which is largely beyond the scope of this article, which is con-
cerned primarily with codetermination as an institution of corporate law.4 8 See text accompanying note 23-24 supra.
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corresponding introduction of the two-tier system. By providing
a homogeneous management and an independent supervisory
board, an American two-tier model would allow management's
responsibility to the employees of the company to be institu-
tionalized without disrupting management's prerogative to initiate
action on such things as investment, financing, pricing and product
determination.
The best focus for grafting the two-tier system onto American
law would seem to be to change the role and make-up of the out-
side directors of the American large publicly-held corporation. At
present the outside directors, despite the fact that under corporate
statutes they have as much responsibility for the management of
the corporation as the insider director-officers, 149 exercise a weak
and subsidiary role. In theory their purpose is to supervise and
advise management,150 but in practice they tend to be loyal and
to represent the insiders who gave them their jobs.' 5' Since out-
siders have little contact with the corporation except at infre-
quent directors' meetings, they rarely voice strong objections to
management policies and let the insiders control the direction of
the corporation.-' In the past few years there has been the
beginning of a trend in the courts to ameliorate this situation,
giving outside directors new responsibilities for safeguarding in-
vestor interests.
5 3
The use of the two-tier model could accentuate and strengthen
this trend by transforming the outsiders into a truly supervisory
body and assuring both their independence from active manage-
ment and their practical effectiveness. The first step could be to
do away with the legal fiction which under present corporate
statutes makes outsiders, at least under the language of the
statutes, equally responsible with the inside board for the man-
agement of the corporation. Instead, their duties should be
separate from the insiders' duty to manage. Second, new con-
149 See Conard, Functions of Directors under the Existing System, 27 Bus.
LAW. 23, 28-24 (Special Issue 1972).
150 Mace, Functions of Directors under the Existing System, 27 Bus. LAw. 32,
33-35 (Special Issue 1972).
'51 Conard, supra note 13, at 917.
' 5 2 See Mace, supra note 150, at 35-37; see generally M. MAcE, DnmEcros:
MYTH AND BREArry (1971).
153 See Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
994 (1971).
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cepts should be developed to define their duties, responsibilities
and functions as supervisory and advisory. American law should
define these duties and the decisionmaking process in more
detail than the German law, which is very vague and weak in
this area.154 Third, at least some of the members of the super-
visory body should be required to be full-time employees, expert
in a relevant discipline, to avoid the pitfall in German law of a
weak supervisory council.' 5 Fourth, the outside supervisory
board could be required to be a pluralistic group, including per-
haps employee representatives directly elected by the work force
of the company, so that people of differing backgrounds would
be included.
This latter point would be very controversial in the United
States. It is possible, of course, to adopt the two-tier form through
strengthening the role of the outside directors without mandatory
worker representation. But German studies seem to prove the
value of worker representation. The conflict of interest problem
is not so severe as had originally been thought; workers have a
stake in and are interested in furthering the profitability of the
company, and this institution has been particularly useful for
protecting the workers' social and individual interests. The large
corporation has developed into a socio-political bureaucracy in
which the workers' individual desires are often ignored by union
and company alike. The development of an institution to safe-
guard such matters coincides with the long term trend of the law
to emphasize individual rights as compared to the historical
preoccupation with property rights.
The exact number of worker representatives would be a source
of much discussion, as it has been in Germany. Parity representa-
tion of workers and shareholders might seem desirable since this
would recognize the equality of both factors of production-labor
and capital. Moreover, in the large corporation the worker is
more closely associated with the corporation than are the share-
holders. On the other hand, the Biedenkopf Commission found
that the advantages of codetermination on the enterprise level
can be obtained without parity.' 56 Perhaps the best solution
154 See note 84 supra.
155 See text accompanying notes 79-85.
156 Biedenkopf Report at 182-84.
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would be to deemphasize the "interest group representation" on
the supervisory board and to provide that all the members, no
matter how or by whom elected, have the clear responsibility of
assuring the well-being of the organization as a whole, not just
the interests of their narrow constituencies.
Fifth, to further strengthen the outside directors and to trans-
form them into a true supervisory group, they could be given
control of the proxy solicitation machinery.5 7 This would be
analogous to the German practice in which the supervisory
council has the power to select and remove members of the
managing board. 58 This would provide a curative effect to our
present system which, although based on the theory of share-
holder democracy, allows management to control its own election
through its control of the solicitation of proxies.
This transformation of the outside directors in the publicly
held corporation into a supervisory body with real strength
should not, of course, replace external regulation by the SEC and
other governmental agencies. Such external governmental control
and supervision has proved its worth and should continue. The
supervisory group could, however, provide a valuable supplement
to the work of the public agencies in addition to its role of pro-
viding correctives to management's business decisions. In con-
trast to government agencies, which are removed from the deci-
sion-making process and whose staffs are often overburdened, the
supervisory group would be close to the process of decisionmaking
and able to influence its formative stages.
The separation of the managerial and supervisory-advisory
functions would have many advantages. The supervisors could
exercise preventive control and give independent advice on the
wisdom of business and financial decisions. In addition, the
functional separation of active management and supervisors
could ameliorate the presently vague and overly-broad liabil-
ity standards of American corporate law. 59 Instead of liability
concepts so indeterminate that they are rarely applied, the
liability of directors could be more closely defined in rela-
tion to their respective functions. The supervisory group could
1I7 Conard, supra note 13, at 918.
' 5 8 See text accompanying note 63 supra.
159 See Conard, supra note 13.
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also be given the task of deciding matters such as manage-
ment salaries, corporate opportunity, conflicts-of-interest, and
other matters in which the managers have a self-interest. This
would seem to be a better solution to conflict-of-interest problems
than the present American doctrine of approval by the disin-
terested directors, which opens the way for reciprocal dealings.160
Strengthening the role of the outside directors could also influ-
ence the corporation to act more responsibly in relation to the
public interest. This need not mean that the supervisory groups
would relegate the growth and profitability of the enterprise to a
subsidiary status. Instead the role of supervision would be to as-
sure that public, consumer, safety and environmental laws and
public policies be strictly adhered to by the corporation and that
profits be maximized within the confines of public laws and poli-
cies. 6' The naming of specific "public interest" directors may not
be necessary and may be counterproductive. A pluralistic board
of supervisors, including employees of the company, could be
expected to assert different kinds of public responsibilities without
the necessity that individuals specifically have a responsibility to
assert the interests of any one group, be it the public or the
workers. 62 They should all individually and collectively have the
responsibility of weighing and balancing the competing factors
and interests involved in the process of decisionmaking.
V. CONCLUSION
The two-tier model for the structure of the modem corpora-
tion is an interesting focal point for corporate law reform both
in Germany and the United States. In Germany, although the
model has proved its value, reform is needed. The supervisory
board of the German corporation should be strengthened to assure
its independence from active management and its practical effec-
tiveness through the requirement that a certain number of its
160 See STEI , supra note 14, at 386. For materials on the American law of
directors' conflicts-of-interest see N. LATrIN, R. JENNIcs & R. BTJXBAUM, COato-
RATIONS, CASES AND MATERIALS 620 ff. (1968).
161 This necessity is admitted by the most die-hard adherents of the profit
maximization principle. See Rostow, supra note 1, at 67.
162 This is borne out by the German practice. See text accompanying notes
102-04 supra. The Biedenkopf Report rejected the idea that in Germany the
supervisory board should contain specific "public interest" members. Biedenkopf
Report at 191-93.
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members be devoted full-time to their duties and be qualified
experts in an area relevant to their function. The number of
worker representatives on the supervisory board should be in-
creased, and a greater effort is necessary to involve individual
workers in the "co-decisionmaking" process.
In the United States, the two-tier system should not be intro-
duced without greatly modifying it and adapting it to American
legal institutions. The two-tier model can, however, point the
way to American corporate law reform through strengthening
the role of the outside directors in the large, publicly-held corpo-
ration and transforming them into a true supervisory and advisory
body.
